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Chromatic dispersion is one of the main limitations to the security of quantum communication
protocols that rely on the transmission of single photons in single mode fibers. This phenomenon
forces the trusted parties to define longer detection windows to avoid losing signal photons and
increases the amount of detection noise that is being registered. In this work, we analyze the effects
of chromatic dispersion on a photon pair generated via spontaneous parametric down-conversion
and propagating in standard telecommunication fibers. We also present the possibility of reducing
the detection noise by manipulating the spectral correlation of the pair. As an example, we show
that our results can be used to increase the maximal security distance of a discrete-variable quantum
key distribution scheme in which the photon source is located between the legitimate participants
of the protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Single photon sources are essential for the experimental
implementation of various quantum information process-
ing and communication protocols. One of the most popu-
lar types is based on the process of spontaneous paramet-
ric down-conversion (SPDC) [1–4]. However, the SPDC
photons are typically broadband, which manifests in tem-
poral broadening during their propagation in a dispersive
medium [5], such as single mode fibers (SMF). This effect
has deteriorating influence on the performance of quan-
tum communication protocols. This is because one of
the most important factors limiting their security is the
detection noise and its probability of occurrence is pro-
portional to the duration of the photon detection win-
dow. Unfortunately, the chromatic dispersion effects due
to the propagation in SMFs limit the possibility of nar-
rowing the time window.
Nevertheless, the effects can be reduced or even can-
celed [6, 7]. Local and nonlocal dispersion cancellation
has been experimentally demonstrated [8–12] and some of
the resulting ideas were applied to measure the dispersion
of the biphoton [13]. The effects have also been analyzed
in the context of realistic SPDC sources [14]. Next, it
was shown that the spectra of fiber-coupled SPDC pho-
ton pairs can be correlated negatively [2, 15], positively
[3, 5, 16–18] or not correlated at all [4, 19–21]. While the
possibility to enhance the security of quantum protocols
by tailoring the photon pair state has been applied pre-
viously as a countermeasure against polarization mode
dispersion [22, 23], to the best of our knowledge it has
not been considered yet for reducing the effect of chro-
matic dispersion.
In this work, we theoretically analyze the propagation
of a SPDC pair through a pair of SMFs over distances
long enough for chromatic dispersion effects to be pro-
nounced. We investigate how the spectral correlation
∗ kolenderski@fizyka.umk.pl
can influence the possibility to reduce the detection noise.
Our results are subsequently applied to the security anal-
ysis of a discrete-variable quantum key distribution (DV
QKD) scheme with a SPDC source of photons located
in the middle between the legitimate participants, called
Alice and Bob. We show that when the global time refer-
ence, i.e. the timing information of the pump laser pulses,
is not available to the participants of the protocol, Alice
and Bob can achieve considerably longer maximal secu-
rity distance by utilizing the photon pairs featuring pos-
itive spectral correlation as compared to negative. This
is possible as long as the photons are relatively broad-
band. On the other hand when the global time reference
is available, the QKD security distance can be maximized
by using strongly correlated (decorrelated) photon pairs
if their spectra are broad (narrow).
II. DISPERSION EFFECTS
Let us assume that SPDC photons are coupled into a
pair of SMFs of length L. The propagation is described
by the unitary transformation of the initial wave func-
tion, ψ(t′1, t
′
2) [24]:
ψL(t1, t2) =
∫
dt′1 dt
′
2 S1(t1, t′1, L)S2(t2, t′2, L)ψ(t′1, t′2),
(1)
where ψL(t1, t2) is the resulting state at the output of
the fibers and
Sk(tk, t′k, L) =
1√
4piiβL
exp
(
i(tk − t′k)2
4βL
)
(2)
is a propagator introducing the evolution. The chro-
matic dispersion is taken into account up to second or-
der in terms of frequency detuning, ν = ω − ω0, from
the central frequency ω0. For the derivation of Eq. 2,
the spectral frequency is expanded in the following way:
k(ν) = k(0) + 1vg ν + βν
2, where vg stands for the group
velocity and 2β is the group velocity dispersion. As a
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2concrete example we consider SMF28e+ fibre in our anal-
ysis, for which β = −1.15 × 10−26 s2m . We assume that
the time reference frame is moving with the wavepackets.
Therefore, its center is shifted by L/vg with respect to a
stationary frame.
The spectral wave function of a fiber-coupled SPDC
photon pair can be approximated analytically using a
bivariate normal distribution [5, 25, 26]:
φ(ν1, ν2) =
1
√
pi
√
σ1σ2
√
1− ρ2
×
× exp
(
− 1
2 (1− ρ2)
(
ν21
σ21
+
ν22
σ22
− 2ν1ν2ρ
σ1σ2
))
, (3)
where σ1 and σ2 are the spectral widths of the photons,
and ρ is the spectral correlation coefficient. The param-
eters of the biphoton wave function σ1 and σ2 and ρ de-
pend on the characteristics of the SPDC source such as
the crystal thickness, cut angle, and its dispersion prop-
erties [25–27]. It was recently shown how the spectral
correlation ρ can be controlled by adjusting the SPDC
setup parameters [5, 17, 28]. It is noteworthy to say that,
in particular, the positive values of spectral correlation
can be achieved only in type II phase matching config-
uration. In the examples presented further on we take
ω0 = 1550 nm and σ1 = σ2 = 1.57 THz (2 nm) if not
stated differently. In order to derive the state of the pho-
ton pair after the propagation in SMF over the distance
L, we Fourier-transform the wave function Eq. 3 into
the time domain and apply the propagator introduced in
Eq. 1, which results in:
ψL(t1, t2) =
i
√
σ1σ2
4
√
1− ρ2√
−pi (f(−σ21σ22) + 2iβL (σ21 + σ22))
×
× e−
2iσ21σ
2
2βL(1−ρ2)(t21+t22)+σ21t21+σ22t22+2σ1σ2ρt1t2
2f(−σ21σ22)+4iβL(σ21+σ22) , (4)
where we introduced:
f(x) = 1 + 4xβ2L2(1− ρ2). (5)
An example of initial spectral, φ(ν1, ν2), and temporal,
ψ(t1, t2) wave functions, and the state after the propaga-
tion are depicted in Fig. 1. The spectral wave function,
φ(ν1, ν2), features positive correlation, ρ = 0.9, which
means a positive detuning from the central frequency of
photon number 1 is correlated with a positive detuning
of photon number 2, see panel (a). In the time domain
it is the opposite as can be seen in panel (b). When the
photon pair propagates in SMFs, the type of temporal
correlation switches from negative to positive value with
increasing distance, see panel (c).
III. SPECTRAL AND TEMPORAL
ENTANGLEMENT
In order to fully quantify the temporal correlation
we resort to the Pearson’s coefficient, which has been
previously applied in the analysis of SPDC photons in
Refs. [5, 28]. Note that it is related to the Schmidt num-
ber [25, 29], but carries additional information about the
sign of correlation. For the wave function, given in Eq. 4,
it reads:
rt1t2(L, ρ) =
−ρf(−σ21σ22)√
f(σ41)f(σ
4
2)
. (6)
One can see from Eq. 4 and Eq. 6 that the correlation
in amplitude disappears when f(−σ21σ22) = 0 or ρ = 0,
but the correlation in phase disappears only when ρ = 0.
Therefore, if the initial wave function was entangled, it
remains such during the propagation process. It can be
also observed that although for the case of L = 0 the
Pearson’s coefficient equals rt1t2 = −ρ, for L → ∞ it
transforms into rt1t2 = ρ. This means that in the limit
of long fiber lengths the correlation in the time domain is
the same as the spectral correlation, which is illustrated
in Fig. 1.
The Pearson’s coefficient, rt1t2(L, ρ), is depicted in
Fig. 2. From the experimentalist’s point of view it is im-
portant to know the propagation distance at which the
magnitude of the temporal correlation is getting close
to the asymptotic limit. Here we consider a distance,
L0.95, for which the Pearson’s coefficient takes the value
of 0.95ρ. It is marked with the dashed contour in Fig. 2.
It can be shown that L0.95 gets longer with the decreas-
ing photon bandwidth. As we will see later, an important
quantity in the context of the security of long-distance
QKD schemes is the distance L0 at which rt1t2 = 0. It
corresponds to the point where the temporal correlation
changes its sign. Utilizing the formulas Eq. 5 and Eq. 6
it is easy to find that:
L0 =
1
2σ1σ2β
√
1− ρ2 . (7)
IV. DETECTION TIME CHARACTERISTICS
The temporal correlation has strong influence on the
expected detection time. If information on the detection
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FIG. 1. The spectral (a) and temporal (b) wave functions
φ(ν1, ν2) and ψ(t1, t2) for L = 0. The functions are real-
valued. (c) The phase and the amplitude of the photon pair
state, ψL(t1, t2), after a long propagation distance, L = 10
km for the initial spectral correlation ρ = 0.9.
3time of photon number 2 is not available, which we call
the no-heralding scenario, the probability density for the
detection time of photon number 1 can be computed as
a marginal distribution:
∫
dt2 |ψL(t1, t2)|2. In this case
the temporal width of photon number 1 can be calculated
as the standard deviation of this probability density. It
reads:
τ1(σ1) =
√
2σ21β
2L2 +
1
2σ21(1− ρ2)
. (8)
On the other hand, if the detection time of photon num-
ber 2 is known to be T2, the probability density for the
detection time of photon number 1 can be calculated as:
|ψL(t1, T2)|2∫
dt1 |ψL(t1, T2)|2
. (9)
Analogically, in this case the temporal width of photon
number 1 is given by:
τ1h(σ1, σ2) =
√
(f(−σ21σ22))2 + 4β2L2(σ21 + σ22)2
2σ21f(σ
4
2)
. (10)
We call this the heralding scenario.
Fig. 3 shows the temporal widths for the heralding, τ1h,
and no-heralding, τ1, cases as a function of the propaga-
tion distance L. It can be seen that heralding results in
wave packet narrowing. For long propagation distances,
L, the ratio τ1h(σ1, σ2)/τ1(σ1) ≈
√
1− ρ2 depends only
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FIG. 2. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient, rt1t2(L, ρ), as
a function of initial correlation ρ and SMF length L. The
dashed contour indicates a distance, L0.95, at which the cor-
relation coefficient rt1t2(L, ρ) = 0.95ρ.
on ρ. Therefore, the stronger the initial spectral corre-
lation, the narrower the heralded wave packet compared
to the not heralded one. These two temporal widths are
equal at the propagation distance L0 given in Eq. 7, see
Fig. 3.
So far we assumed that the detectors’ quantum ef-
ficiency is 100% and their timing resolution is perfect,
which means that there is no timing jitter. Now we also
take into account the possible non-zero detection jitter,
τj . In this case the overall temporal widths of photon
number 1 in the no-heralding and heralding cases can be
computed as
√
τ1h(σ1, σ2)2 + 2τ2j and
√
τ1(σ1)2 + τ2j , re-
spectively. The resulting temporal widths calculated for
the cases where τj = 20 ns (FWHM) are depicted with
dashed lines in Fig. 3. Note that for the (no-)heralding
scenario there is the jitter of (one) two detectors taken
into account.
In the situation when photon number 2 was registered
at time T2, the center of the probability function for the
detection time of photon number 1 moves from 〈t1〉 = 0
to
〈t1〉T2 = −T2ρσ2f(−σ21σ22)/(σ1f(σ42)). (11)
This means that in order to get the advantage from the
possibility to reduce the duration time of her detection
windows, Alice has to shift the center of this window
accordingly to the above formula for each detection event
at Bob’s setup individually. Otherwise the advantage is
lost. The proportionality factor depends on the initial
spectral correlation ρ.
In many experimental applications the exact detection
time of the heralding photon may be unknown due to
e.g. the lack of global time reference. Let us assume that
only the difference between the detection times of the two
photons, ∆t = t2 − t1, can be measured (i.e. Alice and
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FIG. 3. The photon detection time widths τ1 (blue), τ1h
(red) and τ1h,∆t (green) as a function of the propagation dis-
tance L for ρ = 0.9 and the detection timing jitter τj = 0
(solid lines) and τj = 20 ps(FWHM) (dashed lines). The in-
set shows the corresponding detection probability functions
of finding a photon at time t1.
4Bob have only the mutual time reference, while the global
time reference is not available to them). Starting from
the formula 9 expressed in terms of t1 and ∆t it can be
shown that the temporal width of the heralded photon,
calculated as the standard deviation of the probability
distribution for the time difference ∆t, reads:
τ1h,∆t(σ1, σ2) =
√
(σ21 + σ
2
2)f (σ
2
1σ
2
2) + 2σ1σ2ρf (−σ21σ22)
2σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
.
(12)
The above temporal width is plotted with the green solid
line in Fig. 3. From this figure it is clear that even if the
global time reference is not distributed to Alice and Bob,
it can be possible to narrow the temporal width of the
heralded photon as compared to the no-heralding case, if
only the propagation distance is long enough. This effect
is essential for the QKD security analysis performed in
the further section.
In all three of the cases analyzed in our work the tem-
poral widths of the photon number 1 depend on the value
of ρ. Therefore, by manipulating the type of spectral
correlation between the photons produced in the SPDC
source it can be possible to narrow these temporal widths.
This possibility can be clearly seen in Fig. 9, presented
in Appendix C. This effect has a lot of potential appli-
cations. In particular, it can allow for the decreasing of
the duration time of the detection windows for the sig-
nal and idler photons. In this way one can improve the
efficiency of the temporal filtering, which is a popular
method used for the reduction of the detection noise in
various quantum communication protocols.
V. APPLICATION
As an example, the application that can benefit from
narrowing the temporal width of the SPDC photons we
consider a standard DV QKD scenario depicted in Fig. 4.
The detailed description of the scheme and its security
analysis are included in Appendix A. In this section of
our article we will demonstrate how the maximal secu-
rity of this scheme can be increased by manipulating the
type of spectral correlation between the photons pro-
duced by the SPDC source and subsequently sent to Alice
and Bob. We assume here that Alice and Bob use four
identical free-running detectors with the dark count rate
d = 103 counts/s, quantum efficiency of 100%, timing jit-
ter τj and without the photon-number-resolution ability.
We also assume that the source produces exactly one pair
of photons at a time. The loss related to propagation in
SMF28e+ is taken into account.
We consider two situations for the application of tem-
poral filtering: i) global time reference is available for
Alice and Bob, which means that they always know the
exact moments t1 and t2 of their clicks in relation to
the time of the generation of a given photon pair, and
ii) global time reference is not available, but Alice and
Bob share mutual time reference, so they do not know t1
Alice Bob
SPDC
source
PBS
R
fiber
L
R
fiber
L
PBS
FIG. 4. A source-in-the-middle scheme for the implementa-
tion of DV QKD protocols. R denotes polarization rotators.
and t2 but can find the value of relative time difference
between their detections, ∆t = t2 − t1.
The temporal filtering for the first case, i), consists of
two parts. Firstly, the global time reference allows Alice
and Bob to reduce their dark count rates even without
communicating with each other. It is because for each
photon pair they can separately find time windows in
which they can expect their detection to take place and
disregard all of the other clicks. We assume that Al-
ice fixes the duration of her time windows on the level
of τ I1 (σ1) = 6τ1(σ1), which gives her the probability of
99.73% for a successful detection. Analogously, the du-
ration of Bob’s time windows equals τ I1 (σ2). In principle,
Alice and Bob could establish shorter detection windows
in order to reduce the number of registered dark counts
even more at the expense of losing considerable part of
the SPDC photons. In the idealized situation consid-
ered here, in which all of the errors appearing in the
protocol originate from the dark counts and the SPDC
source never emits more than one pair of photons at a
given time, shortening the detection window would al-
ways lead to the increase of the maximal security dis-
tance for QKD. However, key generation rate would be
reduced at the same time, which is not desirable from
the practical point of view. Moreover, all of the results
presented in this paper are qualitatively the same if we
consider shorter detection windows for Alice and Bob.
The second part of the temporal filtering can be per-
formed during the basis reconciliation stage when Alice
and Bob communicate with each other and disregard all
of their measurement results that cannot be paired up
properly. To do this, one of them, say Bob, sends to
the other one all his detection times. Next, for each one
of these time moments Alice assigns the corresponding
time window, which equals to τ I1h(σ1, σ2) = 6τ1h(σ1, σ2),
where she searches for the click registered by her own de-
tector. Only if Alice’s search was successful, a given pair
of clicks is accepted. The roles of Alice and Bob can be
interchanged.
On the other hand, if the global time reference is not
available, the legitimate participants cannot apply tem-
poral filtering for their results separately. In order to
calculate the dark count rates, we define τ II1 as the du-
ration of a time slot corresponding to a single photon
pair. Since the whole set of all such time slots have to
cover the entire duration of the key generation process,
τ II1 can be related to the repetition rate of the source
as τ II1 = 1/r. In practice, r can be limited by various
5experimental factors [30]. If the photons are transmit-
ted over a long distance, the dispersion effects also limit
the maximal repetition rate, because of an overlap of the
time slots of two consecutive signals. It can increase the
ratio of errors and deteriorate the key. We do not opti-
mize over the repetition rate, but we assume it is equal
to r = 10MHz, which is a reasonable value for typical
realistic implementations.
Even if the global time reference is not available to
them, but Alice and Bob share mutual time reference,
they can apply temporal filtering during the stage of basis
reconciliation. After receiving information from Bob on
the time moments at which he registered all of his clicks,
Alice should set the time windows for her own measure-
ment results based on the function of the detection proba-
bility derived for ∆t. The optimal width for such window
is equal to τ II1h(σ1, σ2) = 6τ1h,∆t(σ1, σ2). Once again the
roles of Alice and Bob can be interchanged.
Figure 5 presents the results of our security analysis
of the QKD scheme for the situations i) and ii) for the
BB84 protocol [31] with the assumption that the detec-
tors used by Alice and Bob are not affected by the detec-
tion jitter. By looking at the panel (a) one can conclude
that the security of the DV QKD protocols can be sig-
nificantly improved by utilizing photon pairs featuring
positive spectral correlation when the information about
the global time reference is not available to Alice and
Bob. In the opposite case, what matters is not the type
of spectral correlation, but its strength, as the maximal
security distance grows when |ρ| increases.
Note that the above conclusions can be substantially
different for smaller bandwidths σ1 and σ2. It can be seen
in Fig. 5 (b), where a plot analogous to the one in panel
(a) was made for σ1 = σ2 = 10 GHz. First of all, for
the case when the global reference time is not available
to Alice and Bob, positive spectral correlation appears
to be worse than the negative one in the context of QKD
security. This can be explained by the fact that the value
of L0, for which the initial type of temporal correlation
switches to the opposite one, strongly depends on the
bandwidth as given in Eq. 7. For σ1 = σ2 = 10 GHz this
distance is already much longer than the maximal secu-
rity distance for the BB84 protocol. Therefore, in this
case at the maximal security distance negative spectral
correlation still corresponds to the positive temporal cor-
relation (as for L = 0) and vice versa. This is opposite
to the case of σ1 = σ2 = 1.57 THz, plotted in panel (a).
There is another surprising conclusion which can be
drawn from Fig. 5 (b). In the case when the global time
reference is available to Alice and Bob the lack of spectral
correlation between the photons may be more advanta-
geous for the participants of a given QKD protocol than
the strong correlation. This can be explained by looking
at the Fig. 6 where the values of the temporal widths
τ1, τ1h and τ2h were plotted as functions of the spec-
tral widths σ1 = σ2 for different values of L and ρ. By
looking at the left-hand side of the panels (a) and (b)
of this figure, one can conclude that for narrow spectral
widths of the photons emitted in the SPDC process the
values of τ1h and τ2h are fairly independent of ρ. On
the other hand τ1 is significantly lower for ρ = 0 than
for |ρ| = 0.9. Therefore, the combined influence of these
temporal widths on the key generation rate (described
in details in Appendix B) has to be more favorable in
the case of weak spectral correlation. However, when the
spectral widths of the photons emitted in the SPDC pro-
cess are relatively broad (see the right-hand side of the
panels (a) and (b) in Fig. 6), the value of the temporal
width τ1 becomes independent of ρ, while the values of
τ1h and τ2h become smaller for |ρ| = 0.9 than for ρ = 0.
Thus, in this case the combined influence of τ1, τ1h and
τ2h on the key generation rate is certainly more favorable
in the case of strong spectral correlation.
It is also worth noting that in all of the cases consid-
ered in Fig. 5 the maximum security distance that can
(a)σ1 = σ2 = 1.57 THz (2 nm)
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FIG. 5. Key generation rate, K, as a function of the dis-
tance between the source and the legitimate participants of
the BB84 protocol for photon bandwidths a) σ1 = σ2 = 1.57
THz and b) σ1 = σ2 = 10 GHz, and spectral correlation:
ρ = −0.9 (red lines), ρ = 0 (green lines) and ρ = 0.9 (blue
lines). All the plots were made for the case of the source repe-
tition rate r = 10 MHz and detection timing jitter τj = 0. The
dashed (solid) lines correspond to the case when the global
time reference is (is not) available for Alice and Bob. The
dashed red lines are not visible on both of the panels since
they are identical to the respective dashed blue lines.
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FIG. 6. Temporal widths a) τ1 and b) τ1h = τ2h, given by
the formulas (8) and (10) respectively, plotted as functions of
spectral widths σ1 = σ2 for the spectral correlation coefficient
ρ = 0 (dashed lines) and ρ = 0.9 (solid lines) and for two
different lengths of the standard SMF fibers connecting the
source with Alice and Bob: 20 km (red lines) and 200 km
(blue lines). All the plots were made for the detection timing
jitter τj = 0.
be read out from the panel (b) turns out to be signifi-
cantly longer than the corresponding maximum security
distance in the panel (a). The reason for this is that the
narrower are the spectral widths of the photons created
in SPDC process, the smaller are the effects of tempo-
ral broadening introduced by the chromatic dispersion
during the propagation of these photons in the telecom-
munication fibers. Therefore, the temporal widths of the
signal and idler photons at the output of these fibers are
generally smaller for the case of narrow spectral widths.
However, one should also be aware of the fact that in
realistic situation strong narrowing of the spectral widths
of the photons produced in SPDC process would cer-
tainly decrease the efficiency of a given source. This fact,
which is not included in our simplified analysis, would
have negative influence on the key generation rate. In
order to evaluate the ultimate result of the two effects
described above on the QKD security it would be nec-
essary to perform more elaborate investigation. It can
be predicted that in order to maximize the security dis-
tance of a given QKD scheme based on SPDC source in
realistic situation, Alice and Bob would probably have
to perform some optimization of the spectral bandwidth
of the SPDC photons. The investigation of this problem
lies outside of the scope of this paper.
While the results presented in Fig. 5 were obtained
with the assumption that τj = 0, in realistic situation
non-zero timing jitter of the detectors may considerably
influence the security. We investigated this problem and
found out that the level of τj above which the effect
of timing jitter on the QKD security stops being neg-
ligible strongly depends on the spectral widths of the
photons generated in SPDC process. On one hand, for
σ1 = σ2 = 1.57 THz the negative influence of the timing
jitter on the key generation rate can be safely neglected
in every scenario as long as τj < 200 ps. This inequality
can be fulfilled not only for the high-quality supercon-
ducting detectors [32–34], but also for InGaAs/InP de-
tectors [35, 36]. However, when σ1 = σ2 = 10 GHz and
the global time reference is available to Alice and Bob
the effect of the timing jitter can become visible even for
τj = 50 ps. This is relatively low value, which can be
reached only in some high-quality superconducting de-
tectors. More detailed results of our investigation of the
influence of the detection timing jitter on the QKD secu-
rity can be found in the Appendix B.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we analyzed the state of SPDC pair
propagated through two identical SMFs introducing
chromatic dispersion. This allowed us to analytically in-
vestigate the temporal characteristics of these photons.
In particular, we analyzed the possibility to reduce the
detection noise by applying the procedure of temporal
filtering. The results were used to evaluate the security
of a DV QKD scheme with the SPDC source located in
the middle between Alice and Bob. We analyzed two sit-
uations depending on the availability of the global time
reference. We showed that when it is not available the
maximal security distance can be increased by utilizing
the source with positive spectral correlation, if the spec-
tral bandwidth of this source is relatively broad. A sim-
ilar effect is not possible when the global time reference
is available for Alice and Bob. In this case the security
depends only on the strength of the spectral correlation
but not on its sign. We also discovered that for narrow-
band SPDC photons, the aforementioned advantage of
the positive correlation over the negative one can be re-
versed, while the source emitting uncorrelated photons
can be the best one in the context of QKD security.
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Appendix A: A Discrete Variable Quantum Key
Distribution scheme
From each pair of photons generated by the SPDC
source in the DV QKD scheme pictured in Fig. 4 one
photon is subsequently sent to Alice and the other one
to Bob. Before being coupled in SMFs of lengths L, both
of them go through similar polarization rotators, which
always rotate their polarizations by the same angle, ran-
domly chosen to be 0◦ or 45◦. After receiving the signal,
Alice and Bob independently perform polarization mea-
surements on their respective photons by using standard
setups, consisting of two single-photon detectors and a
polarizing beam-splitter. The beam-splitters can be ro-
tated about the axis parallel to the direction of propaga-
tion of the photons sent from the source. By doing this
the legitimate participants of a given QKD protocol can
change the bases for their measurements. In the ideal
situation, if only Alice and Bob chose the same basis and
this basis is compatible with the rotation applied to the
8photons by the polarization rotators, they can be sure
that the results of their measurements are perfectly cor-
related with each other. In this case the key generated
by the scheme illustrated in Fig. 4 is totally secure.
The most basic quantity used to describe the security
of the QKD protocols in realistic situations is the key
generation rate. Here it is defined as the number of secure
bits of the key that can be distilled by Alice and Bob per
one pair of photons created by the SPDC source. It can
be expressed as [30, 37]:
K = pexp max [0, IAB −min {IEA, IEB}] , (A1)
where in the case of the setup depicted in Fig. 4, pexp
denotes the probability that after the emission of a single
pair of photons by the SPDC source both Alice and Bob
get at least one click in one of their detectors and accept
a given event for the process of key generation. Next,
IAB is the mutual information about the generated raw
key shared by Alice and Bob and IEA (IEB) describes
the amount of information on Alice’s (Bob’s) version of
the raw key which a spy can gain upon an eavesdropping
attack. Since the analyzed setup is symmetric, we can
assume that IEA = IEB . For definiteness from now on
we consider Alice’s version of the key as the base version,
information on which Eve and Bob are trying to gain.
For the BB84 protocol [31], which we focus on in our
calculations, the upper bound on IEA, which Eve can get
by performing the most general collective attacks, equals
[38]:
IBB84EA = H(Q), (A2)
where
H(Q) = −Q log2Q− (1−Q) log2(1−Q) (A3)
is the Shannon entropy and Q, called quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER), represents the ratio of errors in Bob’s
version of the raw key. On the other hand, the mutual
information between Alice and Bob can be expressed as
[30]:
IAB = 1−H(Q). (A4)
In the end, from the formula (A1) for the BB84 protocol
we get
K = pexp max [0, 1− 2H(Q)] . (A5)
From Eq. A5 we can see that the key generation rate
depends on two quantities: the probability of accepting
a given event by Alice and Bob for the process of key
generation and the ratio of errors in Bob’s version of the
key. For any specific implementation of the BB84 pro-
tocol both of these two quantities can be expressed in
terms of the parameters of a given setup. In the case of
the scheme presented in Fig. 4, pexp can be approximated
by:
pexp ≈ T 2 +T (1−T ) [P1h + P2h]+(1−T )2P1P2h, (A6)
where P1h ≈ 2dτ1h is the probability of registering a
dark count by Alice’s measurement system during the
time window τ1h and the other probabilities Px can be
defined in the analogous way. Note that τ2h needed
for the calculation of P2h can be related to τ1h as fol-
lows: τ2h(σ1, σ2) = τ1h(σ2, σ1). The losses of photons re-
lated to propagation in SMFs (for SMF28e+) described
by the attenuation coefficient α = 0.2 dB/km. Thus,
their transmittance can be calculated as T = 10−αL/10.
The first term in Eq. A6 represents the probability that
both photons created by the SPDC source in a single
attempt and subsequently sent to Alice and Bob are de-
tected by their respective measurement systems. The
second term gives us the information about the prob-
ability that only one of these photons is detected, but
during the corresponding time window a dark count is
registered in the other measurement system. Finally, the
last term in Eq. A6 represents the probability that both
signal photons are lost during their transmission in the
fibers. However, Alice and Bob are able to find a pair
of dark counts, which could be mistakenly taken for the
clicks caused by these photons and therefore accepted for
the process of key generation. The approximation Eq. A6
is valid if only all the probabilities Px appearing in this
formula are much smaller than unity. This is always the
case for the realistic values of dark count rates.
Since the dark counts appear in the detectors of Alice
and Bob totally randomly, there is always a 50% chance
for an error in Bob’s version of the key when at least
one of the signal photons emitted by the SPDC source is
lost, but a given event is still accepted by Alice and Bob
for the process of key generation. On the other hand,
if both signal photons reach the measurement systems
of the legitimate participants, they can be sure that the
results obtained by them are perfectly correlated. If so,
the value of QBER can be calculated using the formula:
Q =
pexp − T 2
2pexp
. (A7)
In order to estimate the security of the BB84 protocol
for the setup configuration illustrated in Fig. 4 in the
case when the information about the time reference of
the SPDC source is (is not) distributed to Alice and Bob
one has to find the values of pexp and Q given by Eq. A6
and Eq. A7 respectively and subsequently use the formula
Eq. A5 to calculate the key generation rate.
Appendix B: The influence of the timing jitter of
the detectors on key generation rate
All of the results of the QKD security analysis pre-
sented in this article were obtained with the assumption
that the detectors used by Alice and Bob are not affected
by the timing jitter. In order to find conditions for the
validity of this assumption, we calculated the function
of key generation rate for a few different values of τj in
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FIG. 7. Key generation rate, K, as a function of the dis-
tance between the source and the legitimate participants of
the BB84 protocol drawn for ρ = 0.99 in the cases when the
global time reference is available (panels (a)-(c)) or is not
available (panels (d)-(f)) and the detection jitters are τj = 0
(blue lines), τj = 0.1 ns (green lines), τj = 0.2 ns (purple
lines), τj = 0.5 ns (red lines), τj = 1.0 ns (orange lines) and
τj = 2.0 ns (yellow lines). The solid (dashed) lines denote
the results obtained for the case of σ1 = σ2 = 1.57 THz
(σ1 = σ2 = 10 GHz). The results presented on panels (d)-
(f) were obtained for the repetition rate of the SPDC source
r = 10MHz.
several QKD scenarios and compared it with the analo-
gous function calculated for the ideal case of τj = 0. A
series of plots illustrating the comparison was pictured in
Fig. 7.
One can conclude that the key generation rate is the
most sensitive to the change of value of τj in the case
when the spectral widths of the photons are narrow and
the global time reference is available. This is not surpris-
ing, since in this case the duration time of the detection
windows is the shortest one (which is obvious since the
maximal security distance in this situation is longer than
for any other case). In the situation described above, the
influence of the timing jitter of the detectors on the key
generation rate is visible even for τj = 50 ps, while in
all of the other situations the differences begin to appear
around τj = 200 ps.
The plots shown in Fig. 7 were obtained for ρ = 0.99. It
is a reasonable choice, since the influence of the non-zero
timing jitter on the results of our QKD security analysis
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FIG. 8. The amplitude and phase of the biphoton wave
function, ψL(t1, t2). In the columns the propagation distances
are: 1 m (a, d, g), 41 m (b, e, h) and 82 m (c, f, i). In the
rows the initial spectral correlation is taken to be: ρ = 0.2 (a,
b, c), ρ = 0.5 (d, e, f) and ρ = 0.9 (g, h, i).
is the strongest for |ρ| → 1. Thus, one can be certain that
if a given value of τj can be neglected during the QKD
security analysis when |ρ| ≈ 1, it can be also neglected
for other values of the spectral correlation coefficient.
Appendix C: Correlation and temporal widths
An example of the amplitude and phase of a biphoton
wave function for different propagation distance is pre-
sented in Fig. 8. The distances, L = 1 m, 41 m and 82
m, are chosen to demonstrate how the value of temporal
correlation changes from negative to positive during the
propagation.
The type of spectral correlation has strong influence
on the temporal width of the SPDC photons after the
propagation through telecommunication fibers of length
L. While for the cases when the global time reference
is distributed to the owner of a given detection system
the temporal widths τ1 and τ1h depend on the value of
ρ2 (see respectively Eq. 8 and 10). In the opposite situa-
tion the temporal width τ1h,∆t depends on ρ. Therefore,
τ1h,∆t takes different values for different types of spec-
tral correlation, as can be seen in Fig. S3 (c). In this
case for short propagation distances the temporal width
of the heralded photon arriving at the detection system
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FIG. 9. The temporal widths of one of the photons created
in the SPDC process after both of these photons propagate
through telecommunication fibers of length L in the three sce-
narios described in the Sec. 4 of our article.: no-heralding sce-
nario with available global time reference (panel (a)), herald-
ing scenario with available global time reference (panel (b))
and heralding scenario with unavailable global time reference
(panel (c)). The solid, dashed and dotted lines are drawn for
ρ = 0.9, ρ = 0 and ρ = −0.9 respectively. On panels (a) and
(b) the dotted lines are invisible, because they are the same
as solid lines.
is the smallest for strong negative spectral correlation
between this photon and the heralding photon. On the
other hand, for long propagation distances, τ1h,∆t takes
the smallest value for strong positive spectral correlation.
This behavior of τ1h,∆t is understandable, since for small
L positive spectral correlation correspond to the negative
temporal correlation, while for large L it is the opposite.
The situation is different for the temporal widths τ1
and τ1h, plotted in Fig. S3 (a) and (b), respectively.
Both of these two functions depend only on the strength
of the spectral correlation coefficient, not on its sign. In
the context of application in quantum communication
protocols, long propagation distances (L > 103 m) are
much more interesting to us, than the short ones. There-
fore, it is worth noting here that for L > 103 m τ1 is
generally independent of ρ, while τ1h decreases when the
absolute value of ρ increases.
All of the above conclusions, stemming from the anal-
ysis of Fig. S3, are consistent with the results of the
security analysis of the QKD scheme, which were pre-
sented in Fig. 5 (a).
